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THE DOUBLE-MOVEMENT MODEL OF FORGIVENESS 
IN BUDDHIST AND CHRISTIAN RITUALS
PAUL REASONER & CHARLES TALIAFERRO
Bethel University St. Olaf College
Abstract. We offer a model of moral reform and regeneration that involves a wrong-doer 
making two movements: on the one hand, he identifies with himself as the one who 
did the act, while he also intentionally moves away from that self (or set of desires and 
intentions) and moves toward a transformed identity. We see this model at work in the 
formal practice of contrition and reform in Christian and Buddhist rites. This paper is 
part of a broader project we are undertaking on the philosophy of forgiveness.
Introduction
Many questions swirl around in the general vicinity of forgiveness. Can 
one have a duty to forgive someone? When might forgiveness be a virtue 
or vice? When does forgiveness conflict with justice? Must one confess 
and apologize if one is to receive forgiveness? In the course of a broader 
book project, we are developing what we are calling “the double-movement 
model” of forgiveness that will address these and other questions. This 
model draws from philosophical and religious analyses, historical examples, 
and literary sources. While we want our conceptions to be grounded in 
historical contexts, in the end, we wish to defend a normative position. 
Part of working toward a defensible analysis of forgiveness includes 
learning from forgiveness rituals and asking how they should inform a 
philosophy of forgiveness.
In this essay we focus on texts of confession and forgiveness from 
the Buddhist and Christian traditions. Forgiveness as understood and 
practiced in these texts and rituals will be set against the preliminary 
sketch of “the double-movement model” of forgiveness in part to test 
its viability as a model. This essay is thus an exploratory study to see 
if there are structural similarities in their respective conceptions of 
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confession and forgiveness. If there are differences, are those differ-
ences substantive conceptually? Our tentative thesis is that while the 
general structure is similar in the Buddhist and Christian rituals and 
the texts considered here, i.e., both map well onto the double-movement 
model of forgiveness, the differences in emphasis that do appear are due 
chiefly to the radically different ontological commitments of the two 
traditions. Analysis of these rituals and texts on forgiveness suggests 
two formulations of the concept of forgiveness — relational forgiveness 
and regenerative forgiveness.
The double-movement model of forgiveness
First, consider the double-movement model of forgiveness. In brief, 
the model defends an analysis of forgiveness requiring both the one 
seeking forgiveness and the one offering forgiveness to perform a 
double-movement in terms of each person’s (respective) self-identification. 
The one seeking forgiveness must return to and own the fault (confes-
sion, authentic display of remorse, sorrow for the wrong committed), 
while at the same time moving from self-identification with the self 
who has committed the fault to a new self-identity which repudiates 
the self who commits such faults (a form of self-division). The new 
self-identification is a form of repentance which seeks reform and 
restitution. In a similar movement, the forgiver must recognize the 
identity of the self who has perpetrated the fault while seeing the guilty 
person in a new light — as capable of possessing a new self-identity. 
This is accomplished in part by an empathetic awareness on the part 
of the forgiver that one is capable of committing acts which would 
put oneself in need of forgiveness.
In passing we note that, of course, the full scope of this model may 
fail to be fulfilled in concrete instances in a number of ways. Confession 
may be made and forgiveness asked for, but the one harmed may not offer 
forgiveness. Forgiveness may be given even though there is no repentance. 
Or, forgiveness may be offered without the forgiver making the double-
movement internally. The wrongdoer may ask for forgiveness without 
properly owning the fault and thus minimizing the significance of the 
wrong… and so on. While the full scope of the model may fail to be 
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fulfilled, we argue that where either the wrongdoer or the one wronged 
takes his or her part seriously, something good has been accomplished 
even though it is only a partial good to be sure.
Before examining Buddhist and then Christian forgiveness rituals, let 
us consider a challenge to our current project.
A Preliminary Worry
Consider a preliminary worry and puzzle about the nature and extent of 
forgiveness in Buddhism. One might object that the formulation of the 
double-movement model with its emphasis on self-identity and altera-
tions in self-identity (self-division) is simply assuming too substantial a 
notion of selves to be applicable in Buddhism. One might ask, “Aren’t 
we supposed to get past all that in Buddhism? What about emptiness?” 
And even more fundamentally, is forgiveness that central of an issue in 
Buddhism? One can check the indexes of many texts on Buddhism and 
not even find forgiveness and repentance listed. In fairly standard accounts 
of Buddhism we read statements like the following:
The evil in man’s life is man-made and, therefore, eradicable by man, without 
outside interference. In Buddhism, there is no such thing as original sin, 
no innate depravity, and no one is fore-ordained to be doomed. There is, 
likewise, no atonement and no forgiveness of sins, because there is no one 
who can forgive, and because a transgression, once committed, cannot be 
redeemed.1
Statements such as these suggest that our project here is completely 
misguided. And yet, in a recent book, His Holiness the Dalai Lama 
preaches forgiveness [in the context of discussing forgiveness and spiritual 
progress]:
“It’s [forgiveness] crucial. It’s one of the most important things. It can change 
one’s life. To reduce hatred and other destructive emotions, you must develop 
their opposites — compassion and kindness. If you have strong compassion, 
strong respect for others, then forgiveness is much easier. Mainly for this 
1 G. P. Malalasekera, “The Status of the Individual in Theravada Buddhism,” Philosophy 
East and West Vol. 14, No. 2 (1964): 152. 
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reason: I do not want to harm another. Forgiveness allows you to be in touch 
with these positive emotions. This will help with spiritual development.”2
Elsewhere in the same work, he ties forgiveness to interdependence or 
codependent origination.3 So, on the one hand, forgiveness is said to be 
non-existent in Buddhism; on the other hand it is tied to spiritual devel-
opment in general and central Buddhist doctrines such as codependent 
origination in particular.
How to resolve this apparent difference? The Dalai Lama seems to 
be speaking of the role that forgiveness can play in one’s own spiritual 
growth — not holding grudges and refraining from anger have positive 
effects on emotions and even physical health. This forgiveness is based on 
an awareness of the interdependence between oneself and the other.4 This 
fits well with the double-movement model on the side of the forgiver. In 
agreement with Malalasekera, the forgiveness taught by the Dalai Lama 
affirms the emptiness of the self and the resulting generation of compas-
sion due to an awareness of interdependence. Malalasekera assumes that 
forgiveness implies a substance view of selves and (perhaps) some type 
of ontological transaction. Since the law of karma with its causal effects 
must not be abrogated, there is no forgiveness for Malalasekera since such 
karmic outflows cannot be [magically] wiped away. This suggests perhaps 
two different core conceptions of forgiveness — relational forgiveness and 
regenerative forgiveness. We explicate these below.
A BUDDHIST EXAMPLE: PRATIMOKSA
Another approach to the preliminary worry is to note that forgiveness and 
reconciliation play central roles in early Buddhist rituals and texts. The 
Pratimoksa, the earliest set of rules for monastic discipline in Buddhism, 
was typically recited on days one and fifteen of the lunar calendar by 
the community of monks. While the oldest parts of the Pratimoksa 
2 Dalai Lama, with Victor Chan, The Wisdom of Forgiveness (New York: Riverhead 
Books, 2004), 73. 
3 Dalai Lama, The Wisdom of Forgiveness, 111.
4 See an example of this awareness of forgiveness as interdependence in the case of 
vandalism at a Vietnamese Buddhist temple in Boston in Richard Higgins, “Mindful 
Suffering,” Christian Century 118.29 (October 24–31, 2001): 9–10.
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text probably date from 500–450 B.C.E., the final form of some of its 
earliest versions can be dated to around 400 B.C.E.5 It exists in variant 
forms in the various Buddhist sects and schools in India, Tibet, and 
China.6 Roughly it contains a set of rules for proper living in monastic 
life, including stipulation of punishments for particular actions and for-
mulae for confession, forgiveness, and restitution. The ritual recitation 
of the Pratimoksa twice monthly is a type of communal confession and 
affirmation. It begins with praise, followed by instructions from the 
abbot or leader of the ritual as to how responses are to be made when 
various categories of rules are recited (we are quoting here from the “The 
Pratimoksa Sutra of the Mahasamghikas,” in Prebish):
O Venerable Ones, I will recite the Pratimoksa Sutra. I will speak, and you 
should listen to it obediently and aptly, and reflect on it. For whom there may 
be a fault, let him confess it. If there is no fault, [one] should be silent. By 
being silent, I will know the Venerable Ones are completely pure. Just as, O 
Venerable Ones, there is an explanation for a monk questioned individually, 
so it will be proclaimed in this or that form in the assembly of monks up to 
the third time. For whatever monk, being questioned in this way up to the 
third time in the assembly of monks, who does not reveal an existing fault 
which is remembered, there is the speaking of a deliberate lie. The speaking 
of a deliberate lie has been declared by the Blessed One to be an obstructive 
condition. Therefore an existing fault should be revealed by a fallen monk, 
remembering [the offense and] hoping for purity. Having revealed it, there 
will be comfort for him, but by not revealing it, there is none.7
In general, after each category, the monks will be asked three times if 
they have anything to confess; silence will be taken to mean that they 
are all pure. The categories include precepts whose violation requires 
expulsion, suspension, and other consequences, confession and forfeiture, 
confession and absolution, and so on. Expulsion from the community 
5 Prebish, Charles S. “The Pratimoksa Puzzle: Fact versus Fantasy,” Journal of the 
American Oriental Society Vol. 94, No. 2 (1974): 171.
6 Much useful information about confession and repentance groups (including revivals 
of Pratimoksa practice in China) can be found in Wu, Pei-Yi, “Self-Examination and 
Confession of Sins in Traditional China,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies Vol. 39, No. 
1 (1979), 5–38.
7 Charles S. Prebish, Buddhist Monastic Discipline (University Park and London: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), 48, 50.
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of monks is the punishment for breaking any of the first four teachings 
which the text summarizes (after more detailed description) as “(1) sexual 
intercourse, (2) taking what is not given, (3) slayer of one having human 
form, and (4) asserting that one may have superhuman faculties.”8 We 
note parenthetically that the Dalai Lama in an interview with Victor 
Chan recorded in the book The Wisdom of Forgiveness, when questioned 
about his own spiritual experiences, takes great pains to make sure that 
he is not understood to be claiming more than exactly what he says. He 
interjects that he would have to stop being a monk if he were to tell a 
lie about his spiritual experiences. This appears to be a straightforward 
reference to (4) in the Pratimoksa.9
After the initial four teachings, a set of thirteen are given where faults 
in these areas can result in temporary suspension from the community. 
The last four (of this set of thirteen) allow for admonitions up to three 
times to bring the monk at fault to the state of confession. Faults in this 
set of thirteen include (9) falsely accusing a brother monk of committing 
one of the four initial offenses which are punishable by expulsion. At the 
end of this set of thirteen, the leader recites the typical formula of asking 
three times if all are pure, and the monks assert by their silence that they 
are pure in this category as well. However, due to their special interest, we 
cite briefly several comments made by the leader just before the three-fold 
purity call is made (using a more modern translation of the Pratimoksa 
based on a Chinese version of the text):
If One of this Sangha has broken these Dharmas, willfully concealing it, 
such a one should be placed in isolation for a period equal to the period 
of concealment; willingly or unwillingly should such a one be so confined. 
When the isolation period is ended, let such a one spend six nights undergo-
ing joyful confession, repentance and reflection. When these six nights are 
completed, then with clear mind such a one should be summoned and, in 
accord with this Dharma, should be absolved. Twenty Pure Ones of this 
Sangha may absolve such a one; however, if there is but one less than twenty, 
there is no absolution and those who would conduct absolution with less 
that [sic] the full number shall be called blameworthy. (A Pratimoksa Sutra 
for Western Lands).
8 Prebish, Buddhist Monastic Discipline, 52.
9 Dalai Lama, The Wisdom of Forgiveness, 185.
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At a number of points, elements within the ritual of the Pratimoksa line 
up with the double-movement model of forgiveness. From the side of 
the one needing forgiveness, a vital element in this ritual is confession 
(owning that it is you engaging in the wrongful conduct). Confession 
in itself, in this context, is an indication that one wants to rejoin the 
community (hence a self-identification with a self who will no longer 
perpetrate the fault). Confession is even described as “joyful” which can 
be construed as indicating that the identification with the new self signals 
a radical shift.
An intriguing aspect of the punishment phase is that one is to be 
confined for a length of time equal to the time of wrongful concealment. 
Perhaps the insight here is that the length of time of concealment cor-
responds to how firmly one has identified with the self who is guilty of the 
fault. An equal length of time may be necessary to rid one’s thinking of 
that self-identification and formulate a new self-identification as one who 
rejects such things. (Parenthetically, note that Dante has some of the late 
repentant souls in ante-purgatory also waiting for a length of time equal 
to the time on earth during which they failed to make confession (make 
their peace with the church), before they are allowed to start climbing 
Mt. Purgatory).10
These passages do not focus as much on the side of the one who 
forgives. However, we note in passing the communal emphasis — twenty 
monks must be present and agree for absolution to take place. It appears 
that it is the monks themselves who perform the rite of absolution. In 
this context, a community of monks (not an individual monk) can be 
identified as the forgiver in the double-movement model.
One curiosity in the Pratimoksa ritual is that nothing in the text indi-
cates that actual confessions are expected within the ritual. For example, 
even though the monks are asked three times if they have faults at the 
end of each section, the text has no provision within the ritual for how the 
ritual is to go if someone were to confess. This line of thought might be 
easily dismissed as an argument from silence, except that there is a brief 
passage near the beginning of the Pratimoksa which describes all those 
assembled as pure (“And here no one is unordained, disposed to passion, 
10 Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy: Purgatory, Translated by Mark Musa (New 
York: Penguin, 1981), Canto IV.127–132.
34 paul reasoner & charles taliaferro
a matricide, a patricide, the murderer of an arhant, a schism-maker in 
the samgha...”)11. So, one might characterize the Pratimoksa ritual as a 
confession and forgiveness ritual which is a seal of what has already been 
accomplished prior to the ritual. Prebish offer historical support for this 
interpretation noting that the Buddha once refused to take part in a 
Pratimoksa ritual because an impure monk was present.12
We now shift to an example from the Christian tradition.
A Christian example: THE RULE OF ST. BENEDICt
The Rule of St. Benedict,13 dating from the 6th century C.E., is still followed 
widely and is the model for many later monastic rules (although it itself is 
drawn in part from earlier rules).14 Before offering several passages from 
The Rule of St. Benedict, consider two chapters which focus on faults and 
what is to be done about them:
Chapter 23: Excommunication for faults
If a brother is found to be stubborn, disobedient, proud or a murmurer, or 
at odds with the Holy Rule, or scornful of his elders’ directions, he should 
be admonished by his superiors — in accordance with the Lord’s injunc-
tion — twice in private. If even then he does not make amends, let him be 
reproved in public. However, if there is still no change, he shall be subject 
to excommunication, if he understands what kind of punishment this is. If 
he is obstinate he shall undergo corporal punishment.
11 Prebish, Buddhist Monastic Discipline, 46.
12 Prebish, Buddhist Monastic Discipline, 25.
13 The Rule of St. Benedict, Translated by Anthony C. Meisel and M. L. del Mastro 
(New York: Doubleday, 1975).
14 There is one difficulty with using The Rule of St. Benedict as an example. While it is a close 
comparison to the Pratimoksa in that it contains rules for monastic life, perhaps it lacks a point 
of comparison at the ritual level. While it has often been recited and studied in monasteries 
(indeed Chapter 66 instructs that the Rule is to be read frequently in the community), the 
recitation of the Rule itself has not, as far as we know, functioned as arite of confession 
and forgiveness. It does describe how confession is to be encouraged and forgiveness 
effected. For a more complete ritual of forgiveness, one might need to look elsewhere.
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Chapter 24: The measure of excommunication
The severity of excommunication as a punishment depends upon the nature 
of the violation, which is to be judged by the abbot. For minor faults a brother 
should be kept from eating at the common table. This exclusion means that 
he shall not intone a psalm or antiphon or read a lesson in the oratory, until 
he makes his amends. His meals will be taken alone, after the others have 
finished. If the brothers eat at the sixth hour, he will do so at the ninth; if 
they eat at the ninth, he will eat in the evening. He will continue to behave 
like this until he has been granted pardon by means of some suitable act of 
atonement. (The Rule of St. Benedict, 70–71).
Here again, aspects of the double-movement model of forgiveness are 
clearly present. In Chapter 23, confession (owning up to being the self 
who has perpetrated the fault) is so necessary that one may be admonished 
three times, placed outside the fellowship of the community, and even 
suffer corporal punishment if one fails to make confession. Other passages 
(not quoted above) illustrate the empathetic understanding of those on 
the forgiving side since they are to treat the guilty party with care and 
concern as if the latter were sick, with the implication that we are all sick 
at times (Chapter 27).
Elsewhere (Chapter 13), the Rule states that Lauds and Vespers are 
to end with the Lord’s Prayer, specifically so that the monks will have 
the injunction to forgive on their minds. “Forgive us our trespasses, as we 
forgive those who trespass against us.” To be forgiven one must be active 
in forgiving others. This brief phrase ties together tightly the forgiver and 
the one forgiven in the double-movement model.
The Rule also contains instructions for public penance when late 
for services (Chapter 43), as well as prostrations for particular faults. 
These are clearly designed to aid the one at fault in developing a new 
identity (these acts of penance/punishment are necessary so that the 
monk “will fare better in the future,” or “until he reforms and makes 
satisfaction” — Chapter 43).
Aspects of the double-movement model are clearly displayed 
here as well. We now return to some fundamental conceptions of 
forgiveness.
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Relational Forgiveness and Regenerative Forgiveness
Might it be possible that in both traditions, there is an awareness of two 
possible meanings of forgiveness? The communal necessity of forgiveness 
might fall under the heading of relational forgiveness. All must be well 
between members of the community for the community to function. 
Rituals of forgiveness are necessary to insure the communal bond. In ad-
dition, the examples we looked at add something to the double-movement 
model. This concept of relational forgiveness implies that the new identity 
to be owned by the one in need of forgiveness is not merely a morally 
purified identity; it is also a communal identity. (“I am not simply seeing 
myself as one who is pure with regard to X; I am a member of the samgha 
which includes that I am pure with regard to X.”)
On the other hand, the appeal to a concept of forgiveness where deeper 
ontological change takes place in the order of things might be called 
regenerative forgiveness, for here some change in status is imputed to the 
individual or understood to have happened in the individual. Both tradi-
tions, in the examples we have looked at, focus on relational forgiveness. 
Some Buddhist commentators expressly reject regenerative forgiveness 
given their understanding of the (non-substantial) nature of things 
and the law of karma.15 The comment by the Dalai Lama noted earlier 
focuses on forgiveness as part of ongoing spiritual work that one does for 
oneself — ridding oneself of hateful thoughts and intentions. He says little 
about the effect this has on the one being forgiven. Even in the Rule of St. 
Benedict, where a theology of regenerative forgiveness is affirmed, the two 
seem to be separated — one may fail to achieve relational forgiveness but 
still hold out hope for regenerative forgiveness due to the mercy of God 
(see Chapter 29 on readmitting brothers who leave the community — “If 
he leaves again, he may re-enter a third time. After that he will be forever 
forbidden re-entry” (The Rule of St. Benedict, 74). Similarly, in terms of 
relational forgiveness, the Pratimoksa also has recourse to expulsion.
In later Buddhist contexts, regenerative forgiveness (perhaps suitably 
redefined as karmic changes for the individual outside of the individual’s 
15 Further discussion of comparative puzzles related to karma and grace can be found 
in Stephen T. Davis’ “Karma and Grace,” in The Redemption: An Interdisciplinary Symposium 
on Christ as Redeemer, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, SJ, and Gerald O’Collins, SJ 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 235–253.
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stream of karmic outflows) can be entertained through the compassion of 
bodhisattvas such as Amida in Pure Land Buddhism. Of course even in 
this example, the regenerative forgiveness is at one remove from change in 
the ultimate karmic order, since the bodhisattva must have accrued enough 
karma to overcome the negative karma of the one needing forgiveness.16
Tentative Conclusions
Comparisons of the Buddhist and Christian examples reveal some striking 
similarities and confirmation of the double-movement model of forgiveness.
First, both have the optimal case of confession (the first stage in 
self-division): the Pratimoksa continually, throughout the ritual, gives the 
option for confession, while The Rule of St. Benedict describes a number of 
ways to encourage confession for the reform of the brother.
Second, both entertain the idea of placing the guilty party in isolation, 
perhaps to encourage and cement self-division, or the use of punishment 
to bring the guilty party to a place where self-division is contemplated 
as a live option. In both traditions, separation from the community is a 
significant punishment (note especially The Rule of St. Benedict on eating 
at table). Separation from community, a forced self-division from one’s 
identity as a member, in good standing, of the community, places the 
focus on the guilty party as disruptive of the community and highlights 
that this disruption must be addressed before the individual in question 
and the community can be whole again.
Third, as noted above, one feature of the punishment phase in the 
Pratimoksa dictates that the length of confinement is to be equal to the 
length of time the fault was concealed. The Rule of St. Benedict hints at 
16 The Eighteenth Vow of Dharmakara (who becomes Amida Buddha) in The Larger 
Sutra on Amitayus (also knows as The Larger Sukhavativyuha Sutra) makes the need for 
accrual of merit clear: „If, when I attain Buddhahood, sentient beings in the lands of 
the ten directions who sincerely and joyfully entrust themselves to me, desire to be born 
in my land, and think of me even ten times should not be born there, may I not attain 
perfect enlightenment. Excluded, however, are those who commit the five grave offenses 
and abuse the Right Dharma“ (The Three Pure Land Sutras, 16). When sentient beings 
call on his name, Amida is able to preserve the law of karma by using his surplus merit 
to offset their damaging karmic outflows so that he can take them to the Pure Land at 
their death.
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something similar; even everyday mistakes are to be more severely pun-
ished if they are hidden (Chapter 46). While the double-movement model 
of forgiveness asserts that a self-identification and self-division must take 
place, the rituals studied here make clear that the movement may not be 
so simple, that it may need some external persuasion, and that it may take 
time to solidify the new self-identification. This has been instructive.
Fourth, in comparing Buddhist and Christian thought on regenerative 
forgiveness, one expects to see a difference in emphasis given the differ-
ent ontological commitments. In the forms of Buddhism which do not 
recognize “other power,” the notion of regeneration seems less appropriate 
since any improvement is made by oneself (even as one’s sense of self 
diminishes). One might prefer to speak of self-correction. In the forms 
of Buddhism which do recognize or appeal to “other power” (tariki), 
such as Pure Land Buddhism, a difference with Christianity might still 
be noted given that Amida Buddha has to have accrued enough karmic 
merit to overcome the negative karmic outflows of any person who calls 
on his name with faith. Here the “regeneration” is a re-direction of karmic 
streams. So, historically Pure Land was the “easy path” for those unable 
or unwilling to attempt the traditional (long series of rebirths) method 
of achieving enlightenment in earlier forms of Buddhism. However, 
Amos Yong has suggested that even here, the parallel with Christian 
regenerative forgiveness may be closer than appears at first sight, since 
in Christian thought we have “the Pauline idea that the second Adam 
has to accomplish what the first Adam failed to do, which is to live that 
perfect holy life, and it is this life (the holy karma) which enables Jesus 
to be the sacrificial lamb through whom regenerative forgiveness is made 
available to others (those laboring under the negative karma of the first 
Adam)” (Yong, personal communication, January 9, 2006).
This has been only an initial exploration into forgiveness rituals. We 
welcome suggestions of other rituals to be studied and insights into how 
to make their analyses more fruitful, as we work toward a comprehensive 
inter-disciplinary philosophy of forgiveness.17
17 Paul Reasoner presented this paper at the Ritual Studies Group and Ethics Section 
meeting at the American Academy of Religion (November 2005) and at the Central Division 
Meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers (Union University, TN, April 2008). Both 
Reasoner and Taliaferro are grateful to comments from many at those sessions, and particularly 
thank William LaFleur (responding at the AAR session), Robert Roberts, and Amos Yong.
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